Since the Berlin Plus agreement in 2003, circumstances have changed dramatically. But recently, resurgences of old debates have surfaced, showing that the frictions to which Berlin Plus reacted still exist. US demands for more European defence spending are more urgent – but its response to proposals on military capabilities and EU autonomy reflects suspicions of the past. The EU has recognised the opportunity to become a serious player in the field of defence and security, but its ambitions remain limited by the LACK OF KEY EU capabilities, which will soon be exacerbated by Brexit. The Berlin Plus Agreement consists of seven main parts: The Berlin Plus Agreement is the short title of a comprehensive set of agreements concluded between NATO and the EU on 16 December 2002.  These agreements were based on the conclusions of the 1999 NATO summit in Washington, sometimes referred to as the CJTF mechanism, and allowed the EU to leverage some of NATO`s military assets in its own peacekeeping operations. At the Munich Security Conference 2018, the ELN and the Federation of German Industries (BDI) organised a round table on the state of German-French defence and industrial cooperation and their impact on the rest of Europe. This comprehensive framework for NATO-EU relations was concluded on 17 March 2003 with an exchange of letters between High Representative Javier Solana and the then NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson.  In the perspective of an unpredictable and uncertain future, the Berlin Plus regulations still apply today as they were when they were first agreed. Who knows when and where the operational cooperation between the EU and NATO in the framework of Berlin Plus could make diplomatic and political sense? In addition, some elements of Berlin Plus are irreplaceable, such as the fact that the EU has access to capabilities and assets it does not have and is not expected to acquire anytime soon – and the EU`s military weaknesses can only get worse after Brexit.
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